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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellant, Anthony Lewis, appeals from a judgment of 
conviction and sentence entered in the district court on an 
indictment charging him with distribution of at least five 
grams of a mixture or substance containing a detectible 
amount of cocaine base, which, as a matter of convenience, 
we will call simply cocaine base. A jury found Lewis guilty 
under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) ("section 841(a)(1)") which 
prohibits the distribution of a controlled substance. The 
court subsequently sentenced Lewis to 120 months in 
prison under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) ("section 841(b)") for 
distribution of at least five grams of cocaine base. Lewis 
contends that he is entitled to a new trial because, 
notwithstanding his indictment for distribution of at least 
five grams of cocaine base, the district court instructed the 
jury that it could find him guilty whether he had 
distributed cocaine powder or cocaine base. He argues that 
this instruction infringed upon the jury's fact-finding 
function. He also contends that because the court 
instructed the jury that it could find him guilty whether he 
distributed cocaine powder or cocaine base, the basis for its 
finding of guilt cannot be determined. He thus asserts that 
the district court erred because it sentenced him for 
distribution of cocaine base rather than powder cocaine. He 
claims that this error prejudiced him as the mandatory 
minimum penalties for distribution of cocaine base in 
section 841(b) are more severe than those for the 
distribution of powder cocaine. Finally, Lewis argues that 
even if we uphold his conviction he is entitled to a remand 
for resentencing because the government failed to prove by 
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a preponderance of the evidence that the controlled 
substance he distributed was cocaine base. 
 
The government counters that to prove that Lewis 
violated section 841(a) it needed to prove only that he knew 
he was distributing a controlled substance even if he did 
not know its identity. It also asserts that a jury need not 
determine which controlled substance a defendant charged 
under section 841(a)(1) distributed, provided it determines 
that the defendant distributed a controlled substance. It 
further argues that the district court was correct in 
determining for sentencing purposes the identity of the 
controlled substance that Lewis distributed, for the "type 
and quantity of the controlled substance in an offense is an 
issue of fact to be decided by the court at sentencing." Br. 
at 4. Finally, the government argues that the district court's 
finding that Lewis distributed cocaine base was not clearly 
erroneous. 
 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 
18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). The district court had jurisdiction 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We exercise plenary review 
over the questions before us, except that we review the 
court's finding that Lewis distributed cocaine base to 
determine if the finding was clearly erroneous. 
 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
On February 17, 1995, Edward Jones, a confidential 
informant for the Drug Enforcement Administration (the 
"DEA"), went to Bristol Township, Pennsylvania, as 
instructed by DEA agents, to purchase $2,000 worth of 
crack cocaine from a particular person. App. at 219-21. 
While unsuccessfully seeking that person, Jones met Lewis 
who offered to sell him crack cocaine. App. at 222. After 
obtaining permission from the DEA agents, Jones initiated 
a purchase of cocaine from Lewis. Lewis informed Jones 
that he had 25 dime bags with him, which he gave to 
Jones, and then suggested that Jones drive him to a 
residence belonging to a third person to obtain more. Lewis 
then procured an additional 50 dime bags of cocaine, which 
he also gave to Jones. Jones, in turn, paid Lewis for the 
cocaine. Laboratory analysis showed that Jones purchased 
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7.5 grams of cocaine base from Lewis. App. at 35. Based on 
these events, a grand jury returned a two-count indictment 
charging Lewis with distribution of cocaine base in violation 
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and distribution of cocaine base 
within 1,000 feet of a public housing project in violation of 
21 U.S.C. § 860. App. at 15-16. 
 
Jones testified at the trial, but during his cross- 
examination the district court barred any inquiry into the 
difference between cocaine base and cocaine powder, 
explaining that the difference was not relevant. App. at 
300-04. Lewis also testified, denying that he distributed 
crack, and contending that he had sold cocaine powder to 
Jones. App. at 171-73. App. at 172-73. The district court, 
over Lewis's objection, instructed the jury that it could find 
Lewis guilty regardless of whether he distributed cocaine 
powder or cocaine base. App. at 348-49, 361, 393-94, 396. 
 
The jury found Lewis guilty of distribution of cocaine but 
found him not guilty of distribution of cocaine within 1,000 
feet of a public housing project. We cannot ascertain from 
the verdict whether it concluded that Lewis distributed 
cocaine base or powder cocaine or, indeed, even whether it 
reached a unanimous conclusion on this point. On May 30, 
1996, the district court sentenced Lewis to a custodial term 
of 120 months, a $500 fine, eight years of supervised 
release and a $50 special assessment, the sentence being 
predicated on its finding that Lewis distributed cocaine 
base. As we have indicated, this finding was significant for 
it is undisputed that the sentence for distributing powder 
cocaine would have been less than the sentence the court 
imposed. App. at 10-14. 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
a. Sentencing issues 
 
While ordinarily we would consider questions relating to 
the validity of a conviction before questions relating to a 
sentence, in this case we reverse that order because our 
determination of the sentencing issues informs our result 
on the issues relating to the conviction. Section 841(a)(1), 
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which is entitled "Unlawful acts," prohibits the distribution 
of controlled substances. It states: 
 
(a) Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall 
be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally 
-- 
 
(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess 
with intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense, a 
controlled substance; 
 
. . . 
 
Section 841(b), entitled "Penalties," provides: 
 
Except as otherwise provided in section 859, 860, or 
861 of this title, any person who violates subsection (a) 
of this section shall be sentenced as follows: . . . 
 
(1)(B) In the case of a violation of subsection (a) of this 
section involving -- 
 
. . . . 
 
(iii) 5 grams or more of a mixture or substance 
described in clause (ii) which contains cocaine base; 
. . . such person shall be sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment which may not be less than 5 years and 
not more than 40 years. . . . 
 
The sentence mandated for distribution of at least 500 
grams of cocaine is the same as the sentence mandated for 
distribution of at least five grams of cocaine base -- not 
less than five years and not more than 40 years' 
imprisonment. Section 841(b)(1)(B)(ii). On the other hand, 
the sentence for distributing at least five grams of cocaine 
does not include the five-year minimum term. Section 
841(b)(1)(C). 
 
We have held that the district court rather than the jury 
determines the weight of drugs involved in a section 841 
offense as the amount of drugs involved in an offense is a 
sentencing factor. United States v. Chapple, 985 F.2d 729 
(3d Cir. 1993). Substantial authority supports this 
conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Madkour, 930 F.2d 
234, 237 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Cross, 916 F.2d 
622 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. McNeese, 901 F.2d 
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585, 605 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Jenkins, 866 F.2d 
331, 334 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. Wood, 834 F.2d 
1382, 1388-90 (8th Cir. 1987). While we seem never to 
have decided whether a determination of the identity of the 
controlled substance in a section 841(a)(1) case also is a 
sentencing factor, we conclude that a logical application of 
Chapple constrains us to hold that it is. Thus, the court 
determines the identity of the controlled substance at 
sentencing. 
 
In Chapple, an individual, unaware that he was under 
police surveillance, attempted to send a large quantity of 
cocaine to another state. After the police seized the cocaine, 
the defendants were indicted and tried under 21 U.S.C. 
§ 846 for conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to 
distribute. In addition, one defendant was indicted and 
tried under section 841(a)(1) for possession of cocaine with 
intent to distribute. The quantity of cocaine in the package 
sent was a hotly contested issue because in the event of 
conviction its weight would impact significantly on the 
statutorily available sentence. At trial, the district court 
ruled that the weight of the cocaine was an element of the 
substantive offense which the jury had to determine. The 
jury subsequently convicted the defendants. 
 
On appeal, we affirmed the convictions but vacated the 
sentences on the ground that section 841 clearly 
distinguishes between the elements of the substantive 
offense, as laid out in section 841(a), and the sentencing 
provisions, which are set forth in section 841(b). Thus, we 
held that "§ 841(b) is merely a penalty provision to be used 
at sentencing, after conviction of the substantive crime." 
Chapple, 985 F.2d at 731 (quoting United States v. Gibbs, 
813 F.2d 596, 600 (3d Cir. 1987)). Accordingly, inasmuch 
as section 841(b) rather than section 841(a) deals with the 
weight of controlled substances, we remanded Chapple for 
the district court to resentence on the basis of its 
determination of the quantities involved. We conclude that 
inasmuch as section 841(b) specifies both the quantities 
and identities of controlled substances to be considered in 
determining the sentence, Chapple requires us to hold that 
the district court was correct in its determination that the 
court should determine the type of cocaine Lewis 
distributed as a sentencing factor. 
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At bottom, resolution of the issue with respect to whether 
the jury or the court determines the identity of the 
controlled substance depends on how Congress defined the 
offense under section 841(a)(1). As we observed in United 
States v. Conley, 92 F.3d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. 
denied, 117 S.Ct. 1244 (1997), the Supreme Court has 
permitted a state to treat conduct which arguably was an 
element of an offense, the visible possession of a weapon, 
as a sentencing factor to be determined by the court rather 
than the jury. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 
S.Ct. 2411 (1986). The Supreme Court made clear in 
McMillan that while there are constitutional limits beyond 
which a state may not go in allocating to the trial court 
factors affecting sentences, the requirement that the jury 
determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime depends on how the state defines the 
offense. See id. at 84-86, 106 S.Ct. at 2415-16. In United 
States v. Gaudin, ___ U.S. ___, #6D 6D6D#, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 2321 
(1995), Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized in his 
concurrence that "definition of the elements of a criminal 
offense is entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the 
case of federal crimes which are solely creations of 
statutes." 
 
In this case, Congress clearly defined the offense as the 
distribution of a "controlled substance," seemingly 
purposely refraining from specifying a particular "controlled 
substance" in section 841(a)(1). Furthermore, section 
841(a)(1) is entitled "Unlawful acts," suggesting that the 
section completely sets forth the elements of the offenses it 
creates. While Congress could have enacted separate 
statutes criminalizing the distribution of particular 
controlled substances, it did not do so. Instead, it 
characterized the determination of the identity and the 
weight of the controlled substance as penalty factors in 
section 841(b). We must honor that approach. 
 
United States v. Conley supports our result, as it 
indicates that the sentencing guidelines could make "the 
object of a conspiracy charged under 18 U.S.C. § 371 a 
matter for the sentencer rather than an element of the 
crime" without violating the Sixth Amendment right to a 
trial by jury. Conley, 92 F.3d at 166. Of course, we 
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acknowledge that the authority of Conley is somewhat 
limited here because the object of the conspiracy in that 
case was significant only with respect to the application of 
the sentencing guidelines while here the identity of the 
controlled substance was a factor in establishing the 
possible sentence under section 841(b). Nevertheless, there 
is likely no pertinent distinction to a defendant between a 
court determining facts applicable to setting a guidelines 
range and determining the sentence available under a 
statute. 
 
There is substantial support for our result in other 
circuits. For example, in United States v. Barnes, 890 F.2d 
545 (1st Cir. 1989), the Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit upheld a conviction and sentence in a case in which 
the indictment charged the defendant with possession of 
cocaine base with intent to distribute. In Barnes, the 
district court sentenced the defendant on the basis of its 
finding that the substance involved was cocaine base over 
her objection that one chunk of cocaine seized may not 
have contained cocaine base. The court explained that it 
was 
 
important to note that the court, not the jury, 
determines the quantity and type of controlled 
substance appropriate under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). 
Section 841(b) describes the penalty provisions for 
violations of section 841(a), in this case possession of 
a controlled substance with intent to distribute. 
Therefore, as a penalty provision, the district court 
judge determines the facts at the sentencing, and, on 
appeal, we review the court's factual findings, not the 
jury's verdict. 
 
Id. at 551 n.6 (citations omitted). 
 
Accordingly, in Barnes the court of appeals indicated that 
"the district court judge properly made a finding during the 
sentencing as to the quantity and type of the cocaine." Id.; 
See also, e.g., United States v. Bingham, 81 F.3d 617, 628- 
29 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 250 (1996); United 
States v. McMurray, 34 F.3d 1405, 1414 (8th Cir. 1994), 
cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1164 (1995); United States v. Young, 
981 F.2d 180, 188 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Levy, 
904 F.2d 1026, 1034 (6th Cir. 1990). 
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In reaching our result, we recognize that the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Bounds, 
985 F.2d 188, 194-95 (5th Cir. 1993), has held that 
although the quantity of controlled substances does not 
constitute an element of the crime and is to be determined 
by the court at sentencing, the identity of the controlled 
substance is an element of the substantive crime to be 
determined by the jury. The Bounds court, however, did not 
provide any explanation for the distinction it drew in its 
differing treatment of the identity and weight of the 
controlled substance. Thus, we do not find Bounds 
persuasive and we are unable to rely on it to distinguish 
Chapple from this case. 
 
We also are aware of opinions of other courts of appeals 
which have held that where a jury returns a general verdict 
of guilty to a conspiracy charge under 21 U.S.C. § 846 
covering several controlled substances, the court must treat 
the case as if the defendant conspired to commit an offense 
involving only the controlled substance carrying the lowest 
penalty under section 841(b). See United States v. Bounds, 
985 F.2d at 195; United States v. Owens, 904 F.2d 411, 
414-15 (8th Cir. 1990); Newman v. United States, 817 F.2d 
635, 637-38 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Orozco- 
Prada, 732 F.2d 1076, 1083 (2d Cir. 1984). In several of 
these cases, the court of appeals remanded the case to the 
district court for a new trial unless the government 
consented to imposition of a sentence based on the 
controlled substance carrying the lowest penalty. 
 
But these conspiracy cases are not without detractors, 
because the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has 
held that where an indictment charges conspiracy to 
distribute both powder cocaine and cocaine base, "as long 
as the jury finds that the defendants conspired to distribute 
any drug proscribed by § 841(a)(1), the judge possesses the 
power to determine which drug, and how much [for the 
purposes of sentencing the defendants]." United States v. 
Edwards, 105 F.3d 1179, 1182 (7th Cir. 1997) (emphasis 
in original). While Edwards reached its conclusion for what 
it called the "simple" reason that under the sentencing 
guidelines "the judge alone determines which drug was 
distributed, and in what quantity," id. at 1180, the court 
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recognized that the distinction between powder cocaine and 
cocaine base was significant under section 841(b) as well as 
under the guidelines. Id. at 1181. Nevertheless, the court 
reached its result on the theory that the distinction was not 
germane to identifying the substantive offense committed, 
because an "indictment could charge the defendants with 
`conspiring to distribute controlled substances in violation 
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)' without identifying either the 
substances or the quantities." Id. 
 
Because we conclude that the court at sentencing must 
determine the nature of the controlled substance, the 
government need only have proved by a preponderance of 
the evidence that Lewis distributed cocaine base. See 
Chapple, 985 F.2d at 731; see also United States v. James, 
78 F.3d 851, 857-58 (3d Cir.) (holding that government 
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that cocaine 
base sold by defendant was actually crack if judge is to 
apply enhanced penalty under sentencing guidelines 
applicable to cocaine base), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 128 
(1996). The record in this case compels a conclusion that 
the government met this burden because a laboratory 
analysis established that the controlled substance involved 
was cocaine base. We thus affirm the sentence imposed by 
the district court. 
 
b. Issues relating to the conviction 
 
Lewis also has challenged the indictment and proofs, 
arguing that there was a fatal variance between them. In 
this regard, he points out that even though he was indicted 
for distributing in excess of five grams of cocaine base, the 
court charged the jury that it did not matter whether the 
controlled substance was powder cocaine or cocaine base. 
Lewis asserts that this charge to the jury broadened the 
indictment and violated his right to be tried only on an 
indictment returned by the grand jury. 
 
We reject this argument. As we explained in United States 
v. Padilla, 982 F.2d 110, 113 (3d Cir. 1992) (emphasis in 
original), "[w]hen there is a variance between the indictment 
and the proof at trial and when that variance prejudices a 
substantial right of the defendant, we have held that the 
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conviction must be vacated." In determining whether there 
has been a fatal variance, courts ascertain whether the 
variance affects "the substantial rights of the accused either 
(1) by insufficiently informing [the defendant] of the charges 
against him such that he is taken by surprise and 
prevented from presenting a proper defense, or (2) by 
affording him insufficient protection against reprosecution 
for the same offense." United States v. Pierce, 893 F.2d 669, 
676 (5th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). Here the alleged 
variance clearly was not prejudicial because Lewis does not 
contend that he was unaware that he was being tried for 
the distribution of a controlled substance to Jones. Thus, 
Lewis was able fully to make his defense and there is no 
possibility that he will be indicted again for the events 
involved here. Lewis suffers from the unfortunate fact that 
his defense -- that he distributed powder cocaine-- 
amounted to a confession in front of the jury. 
 
Other courts have held that there is not an impermissible 
variance where the indictment charges the defendant with 
offenses involving one controlled substance but the 
evidence shows that the offenses actually involved another 
controlled substance. Thus, in United States v. Knuckles, 
581 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1978), the defendants were charged 
with possession and distribution of heroin but they alleged 
that the substance was cocaine. Nevertheless, the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction. 
While we recognize that in Knuckles the court pointed out 
that the variance did not affect the sentence, id. at 311, in 
view of our conclusion that the determination of the 
identity of the controlled substance is a sentencing factor 
for the court, we do not see why the difference for 
sentencing purposes between powder cocaine and cocaine 
base should matter in a variance analysis. The Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a holding similar to 
Knuckles, held that where the offense charged is 
distribution of cocaine powder but the evidence at trial 
showed that the substance was cocaine base, there was not 
a fatal variance. United States v. Pierce, 893 F.2d at 676. 
 
We also point out that we see no reason why an 
indictment under section 841(a)(1) for possession or 
distribution of a controlled substance need specify the 
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identity of the substance since, as we have explained, the 
identity of the substance is a sentencing factor rather than 
an element of the offense. See United States v. Edwards, 
105 F.2d at 1181. Accordingly, the allegation in the 
indictment that Lewis distributed cocaine base probably 
was not needed. We hasten to add, however, that we are 
well aware that indictments under section 841(a)(1) 
ordinarily do specify the identity and amount of the 
controlled substance and we do not question this practice. 
Accordingly, United States Attorneys should not take this 
opinion as signalling that that practice should be changed. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of conviction and 
sentence of May 30, 1996, will be affirmed. 
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